Friday, February 28, 2014

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED TO JPM BASED ON ISSUES RAISED BY NARDI DEPOSITION


The author of the following article did not identify the case by name or number making it difficult to use the information to help others defeat Chase. Can anyone provide the case name and number so that others may benefit from the use of the Nardi deposition.  This is about saving homes across the state of Florida and elsewhere.  It takes "a village" to come together to defeat JPMorgan Chase Bank.  The information is public record in Pinellas County, Florida ---- if only we had access to identify the case.


Foreclosure Defense Nationwide

February 28, 2014

"On Tuesday, February 25, 2014, a Pinellas County (St. Petersburg) Florida Judge denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by JPMorgan Chase Bank NA in connection with a WaMu origination. Jeff Barnes, Esq. represents the homeowner and argued the Motion in person in court on Tuesday.

JPM claimed to have come into the right to enforce the Note and Mortgage through “a chain of mergers” (JPM’s Complaint, paragraph 4). As we all know, there was never any “merger” between WaMu and JPM; the deal structure was an asset purchase (and also the purchase of certain defined liabilities) from the FDIC, and that JPM acquired whatever assets the failed WaMu had in its inventory as of September 25, 2008 which were set forth in the deal documents. As we also know, WaMu had sold off almost all of its originations into securitizations prior to its failure, so the most that JPM would have acquired from the FDIC consisted of servicing rights, if that.


The 330-page deposition of former JPM and WaMu mortgage management employee Lawrence Nardi (which deposition was taken in another Florida case) was filed by the homeowner. Mr. Nardi, who was with WaMu through the time that it failed and then through the period during the FDIC asset purchase and thereafter remaining with JPM, testified under oath that there was never, ever, a mortgage loan schedule in connection with the asset purchase, and that it never existed. He also testified that there is no evidence of any transfer of any mortgage loans from WaMu to JPM: no assignments, no allonges, and no endorsements.


The homeowner also filed a excerpt from JPM’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case filed against it and the FDIC by Deutsche Bank in the District of Columbia Federal Court, where JPM admits that it was NOT the “successor in interest” to WaMu, and that it only purchased certain defined assets and liabilities. This admission, of course, is in direct contradiction to the position taken by JPM in thousands of foreclosures nationally where it asserts that it is the “successor in interest” to WaMu.

The Judge recognized the issue of material fact where JPM is taking he position that it has the right to enforce the Note, but JPM’s own former management employee testified under oath that there is no
evidence of any transfer of any mortgage loans from WaMu to JPM and no schedule of any mortgage loans purchased from the FDIC."

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED TO JPM BASED ON ISSUES RAISED BY NARDI DEPOSITION

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

DECISIVE VICTORY FOR CALIFORNIA FORECLOSURE FIGHTERS -- GLASKI v. BANK OF AMERICA

Supreme Court of California Case Notification for: S213814

GLASKI v. BANK OF AMERICA
Case: S213814, Supreme Court of California

Date (YYYY-MM-DD):                     2014-02-26

Event Description:                            
Depublication request denied (case closed)

Supreme Court

 

California Supreme Court Refuses to Depublish Glaski Decision

You remember Glaski, in which a California Appeals Court found that borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans, even if they were not a party to or a beneficiary of the assignment.
In Glaski, the court held that a borrower has standing to challenge an assignment if the defect would void it, but not when it is merely voidable by the assignor. In Glaski, the WaMu Securitized Trust was formed under and governed by New York law, under which a statute provides that every conveyance or other trustee act in contravention of the trust is void. The Glaski court joined other courts in reading the statute literally and held that acceptance of a note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed would be void. Thus, Glaski stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure by alleging that the transfer was ineffective.
Hence began the banks’ feverish efforts to depublish Glaski.  Why?  Because in many jurisdictions, unpublished authority cannot be cited, and lacks the precedential authority of a published decision.
Today, the California Court declined to depublish Glaski, after receiving reams and reams of briefing on the issue.
Strangely, some of California’s trial courts have refused to follow Glaski, raising the issue of whether they are violating principles of stare decisis.
            

Court data last updated: 02/26/2014 04:05 PM
Disposition
GLASKI v. BANK OF AMERICA
Case Number S213814

Only the following dispositions are displayed below: Orders Denying Petitions, Orders Granting Rehearing and Opinions. Go to the Docket Entries screen for information regarding orders granting review.
Case Citation: none
DateDescription

Docket (Register of Actions)
GLASKI v. BANK OF AMERICA
Case Number S213814

Date Description Notes
10/04/2013 Request for depublication filed (initial case event) Defendant and Respondent: JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Attorney: Mikel Allison Glavinovich     (publication order filed on August 8, 2013)
10/04/2013 Case start date (depublication request)    
10/04/2013 Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice (pre-grant)     submitted by Theodore Bacon, counsel for respondent on behalf of Noah Levine.
10/07/2013 Request for depublication filed (another request pending) Pub/Depublication Requestor: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company     Bernard Garbutt, III
10/11/2013 Response in support of depublication request filed  by California Bankers Association and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By appellant's counsel Richard L. Antognini.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Klapach & Klapach, P.C. By counsel Joseph S. Kalpach.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     by Brenda H. Reed, in pro per.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By the Law Office of Ronald H. Freshman. By counsel Ronald H. Freshman.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Arias, Ozzello & Gignac LLP. By counsel Mark F. Didak.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Tia Smith, in pro per.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Charles W. Cox.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By the Law Offices of Joseph L. De Clue. By counsel Joseph L. De Clue.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Monica Graham, in pro per.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Michael T. Pines
10/15/2013 Response in support of depublication request filed     By NDex West, LLC. By counsel Edward A. Treder.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Helen E. Cooney Mueller, in pro per.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     By Rumio Sato, in pro per.
10/17/2013 Received:     Amended proof of service of opposition to depublication by Tia Smith, to reflect corrected service on appellant's counsel Richard Antognini.
10/17/2013 Received:     Original proof of service of opposition to request for depublication from appellant's counsel Richard L. Antognini.
10/21/2013 Received:     Amended proof of service of opposition to depublication by Monica Graham, to reflect corrected service on appellant's counsel Richard Antognini.
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Nimal Diunugala, pro per
10/21/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Amended proof of service of opposition to depublication by Charles W. Cox, to reflect corrected service on appellant's counsel Richard Antognini.
10/21/2013 Received:     Amended proof of service of opposition to depublication by Brenda H. Reed, to reflect corrected service on appellant's counsel Richard Antognini. By Brenda H. Reed.
10/21/2013 Received:     Amended proof of service of opposition to depublication by Klapach & Klapach, P.C., to reflect corrected service on appellant's counsel Richard Antognini. By counsel Joseph S. Klapach.
10/21/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Shelley Erickson, pro per
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Kevin Lawson, pro per
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     James Macklin
10/18/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Steven H. Lucore
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Rick Ensminger, pro per
10/15/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Helen Galope, pro per
10/17/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Sharon K. Nettleton, pro per
10/18/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Patty Nestle, pro per
10/16/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Rick Greer, pro per
10/17/2013 Opposition to depublication request filed     Anita Carr, pro per
02/26/2014 Depublication request denied (case closed)     Kennard and Chin, JJ., were recused and did not participate.

 

Monday, February 24, 2014

California Homeowners Sold Out by Attorney General Kamala Harris

Hat tip to www.foreclosurefraud.com for bringing this to our attention.


AG Kamala Harris is selling homeowners down the river.  


Below is the link to a video in which Candace Jones, a retired bank fraud analysis expert from Santa Babara, is  addressing the manner in which California AG Kamala Harris continues to fail to enforce the Homeowners Bill of Rights and the Mortgage Bank Settlement and prosecute the banks for their violations. The bankers are continuing to steal our land. The district attorneys are not investigating foreclosure abuses.
 
Link to video:   Californians sold out by AG Kamala Harris

The following link will direct you to the testimony given by California homeowner and Vietnam War widow, Brenda Reed, before the California Legislative Committee in support of the passage of the California Homeowner's Bill of Rights. That war widow and foreclosure warrior is the author and compiler of this blog.  As such I express my utter disappointment and frustration as to what AG Kamala Harris's office and District Attorneys are not doing to prosecute bank and foreclosure fraud and to enforce the terms of the Mortgage Bank Settlement and the Homeowners Bill of Rights.  


So many courageous Californians from all walks of life were tasked into working with AG Harris' staff on the committee to enact both the settlement and bill of rights.  We spend countless hours in community meetings, committee meetings, giving testimony, and visiting with California legislators.  We worked diligently for foreclosure victims and homeowners for every concession with our blood, sweat and tears.  I always sensed that AG Harris had higher aspirations and was using us to check off another box on her way up the ladder.  Whenever she appeared in her low cut blouse and pearls, I knew we were going to be used for her political gain and sold down the river.  

I challenge AG Kamala Harris to disprove these observations.  I challenge her to do her job on behalf of California's homeowners.  I say "Rise up, Kamala Harris, rise up!"

Link to video:  California Homeowner & Vietnam War Widow's Testimony Before the California Legislature





Sunday, February 23, 2014

Senate Committee Dave Beck Testimony.-- WAMU Securitizations & Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities,

 
Opening Statement of David Beck April 13, 2010
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs

Chairman Levin, Doctor Coburn, and members of the Permanent Subcommittee, my name is
David Beck. From April 2003 through September 2008 I worked at Washington Mutual Bank,
which I will call WaMu for the purposes of my testimony today. I appreciate the Subcommittee’s invitation to appear to discuss my experiences at WaMu. I hope that I can provide information that will assist the Subcommittee in its investigation of the causes and consequences of the financial crisis.

I understand that the Subcommittee is interested in various topics related to my work in WaMu’s
capital markets organization and to my role and responsibilities with respect to three WaMu
subsidiaries: WaMu Capital Corp., which was called “WCC”; WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.,
which was called “WAAC”; and Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp., which was
called “WMMSC” (pronounced “WIM-zic”). I also understand that the Subcommittee is
interested in learning about my role and responsibilities with respect to Long Beach Mortgage
Corporation, which was a separate subsidiary, first of Washington Mutual, Inc., then of WaMu.
My comments are organized along the lines provided in the Committee’s invitation to me.

An Overview of WMMSC, WAAC, and WCC

Like most other banks that originated mortgage loans, WaMu originated substantially more loans
than it could keep on its balance sheet for investment purposes. And so WaMu’s capital markets
organization managed WaMu’s overall strategy for selling mortgage loans that WaMu did not
retain on its books.

During the time that I was head of capital markets for WaMu, people who reported to me were
responsible for overseeing the entities that purchased and held loans that were to be sold into the
secondary market (WMMSC and WAAC, depending on the time period). WMMSC and WAAC
purchased loans from WaMu, and from other mortgage originators, and held the loans until they
were sold into the secondary market. WCC was a registered broker dealer and acted as an
underwriter of securitization deals for a period of time beginning in 2004 and ending in the
middle of 2007.

In addition to buying and selling mortgage loans, WMSSC acted as a “master servicer” of
securitizations. The master servicer collects and aggregates the payments made on loans in a
securitized pool and forwards those payments to the Trustee who, in turn, distributes those
payments to the holders of the securities backed by that loan pool. These distributions are made
in accordance with the terms of the securitization documents, and each securitization has detailed
rules setting out how loan payments are to be distributed to securities holders. The distribution
rules can be referred to as the “waterfall.”


WCC’s Structure and Operations

Sales of Mortgage-Backed Securities

As I mentioned, WCC was a registered broker dealer and acted as underwriter of securitization
transactions generally involving WMMSC or WAAC
. In such instances, WMMSC or WAAC
would sell, or “deposit,” loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by the
loans in question. WMMSC or WAAC would then sell these securities to WCC as underwriter,
and WCC would sell the securities in the secondary market.
As part of the underwriting process,
WCC conducted due diligence on the loans in the securitization loan pool through the use of
third-party due diligence providers. WCC conducted this diligence regardless of whether the
loans in question had been originated by WaMu or a third-party originator. The diligence
process generally involved the review of loan files for a statistically appropriate number of loans
to be pooled in each securitization trust. A portion of the reviewed loan files were selected at
random, while some were adversely selected based on various negative traits.

WCC sold mortgage-backed securities to a large variety of institutional investors including
hedge funds, mutual funds, commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and the like.
In many instances, the individuals making the investment decision had long-term, hands-on
experience creating and selling mortgage-backed securities. The buyers were thus in a position
to be selective about the types of securities they would purchase based on their judgment,
specific investment needs and objectives. As a result, mortgage-backed securitization deals were
customized transactions. The loans included in a pool to support the securities as well as the
actual securities themselves were constructed based in part on negotiations with the initial
buyers, which often would express a desire for securities with specific credit ratings or
maturities, for example, or for the loan pools to fall within certain credit parameters or
geographical distributions.

Not surprisingly, different buyers are interested in acquiring different types of mortgage-backed
securities, and each makes its own decisions about whether to participate in any given
transaction based, for example, on:

  • Institutional investment guidelines. Some buyers’ guidelines (or indentures orprospectuses) might allow the purchase of only AAA-rated securities. Others might be specifically focused on higher risk, higher-returning securities.
  • A buyer’s current exposure to and appetite for different levels of credit risk. A buyer holding a significant amount of AAA-rated securities might be interested in taking on the additional credit risk, and the additional potential return, of lower-rated securities.
  • The maturities of the securities being offered. Most buyers wanted to hold securities that provide cash flows matching their liabilities. 
  • The various risk concentrations of the loans in the securitization trust. A buyer with an investment strategy focused in low-FICO or high-LTV loans, for example, might not beinterested in a deal backed only by prime mortgages. 
  • The issuer involved in the transaction. Buyers often would seek to diversify their portfolio investments across the mortgage finance industry by holding mortgage-backed securities issued by different issuers off many different registration statements.  Buyer interest in any given mortgage-backed securitization would also depend on the buyers’ existing leverage and capitalization; how the varying returns on equity different buyers could generate and were targeting might be affected by acquiring different types of assets; the buyers’ assessment of the market and economy; and other financial economic considerations. Given that buyers determine what to buy based on their unique interest in and assessment of a specific
    securitization and of the market in general, the value of and interest in any given offering, and
    the loans supporting that offering, would vary from buyer to buyer and from deal to deal. A deal supported by prime loans might be less valuable to a buyer with holdings already concentrated on lower risk loans than to other buyers. A security for a deal with very long final maturity might be less valuable to a buyer who needs shorter-term assets.

Potential buyers of mortgage-backed securities were given access to information about the
securities in question and about the characteristics of the loans underlying the securities. This
included not only the information in the prospectus supplement for each securitization (which
described the types of loans in the loan pool, the underwriting process, and the characteristics of
the borrowers and the security underlying the loans), but also a “loan tape” that included specific
information about the nature of each loan in the pool (borrower’s FICO score, loan-to-value
information, information about the loan type and terms, and the like). Investors also had access
to extensive information, released on a monthly basis, about the performance of prior
securitizations of loan pools made up of the same type of loan product. Investors could review
all of this information before deciding whether purchasing the particular offering would fit into
their overall investment strategy.

In general, WCC concentrated on underwriting securities backed by prime or Alt-A loans that
WaMu had originated or that WaMu or WMMSC had acquired from third-party originators. For
most of my time at WaMu, sales and securitizations of loans originated by Long Beach Mortgage
were done by Long Beach’s separate capital markets group. As a result, while WCC may have
participated as a “co-underwriter” in transactions involving the securitization of Long Beach
loans, any such deals generally would have been led by other underwriters such as RBS
Greenwich Capital, UBS Warburg, Credit Suisse First Boston and the like prior to mid to late
2006. WCC would have been the sole or lead underwriter of securities backed by Long Beach-
originated sub-prime loans only thereafter.

WCC also occasionally participated in whole loan transactions (in which a buyer would acquire
an entire group of loans rather than securities backed by a group of loans). WCC negotiated the
terms of and helped to close whole loan sales undertaken by whatever entity then owned the
loans in question. Typically, these were sales of WaMu-originated loans, though on occasion
WCC would participate in the sale of loans originated by third parties.

Whole loan purchasers were significant players in the financial services, real estate lending and
loan servicing industries. As a result, each bulk whole loan sale was in many ways a unique,
highly negotiated transaction. As with buyers of mortgage-backed securities, whole loan buyers
assess their needs based on their current portfolio of whole loans and target future risk profile.
Some may find themselves concentrated in certain product types or other risk characteristics and
want to buy different kinds of loans or loans to borrowers with different risk profiles (higher or
lower FICO scores or LTVs, for example). In any case, of course, buyers generally sought to
diversify their risk and maximize their risk-adjusted return.

As a natural part of considering whole loan sale transactions, WCC and others in the capital
markets organization were well positioned to help WaMu or WMMSC consider whether the best
execution of a loan sale involved a whole loan sale transaction or a securitization, with the
outcome depending on market demand, the needs and wants of interested buyers, and the like.
Of course, as I suggested earlier, in any given deal the assets in question are more attractive to
one of the parties than to the other, and that difference is in part what allows the deal to be done
in the first place. For example, a lender with a heavy investment concentration in one type of
loan product might be less interested in acquiring or holding loans of that type than a lender
without the same concentration. In such a case, the first lender might sell loans of that type to
the second and thus create opportunities for both.

Other Capital Markets Activities
Hedging

WaMu engaged in hedging activities for various purposes. For example, WCC staff became
responsible in 2005 for hedging the interest rate risk associated with unsold mortgage-backed
security positions and with loans purchased in bulk for resale in the conduit program and held at
WMMSC. And personnel who worked for WaMu, not WCC, hedged (1) the interest rate risk on
loans that had not yet closed, but for which WaMu had made loan commitments; (2) closed loans
that were in a WaMu loan warehouse and awaiting sale; and (3) WaMu’s mortgage servicing
rights. These interest rate risks were hedged by purchasing various types of securities (including
mortgage-backed securities), swaps, options, and other derivatives. Importantly, neither WCC
nor WaMu was approved to trade in credit default swaps, and CDS were not used to bet against
the performance of mortgage-backed certificates that WCC sold.

Because WaMu’s capital markets organization was engaged in the secondary mortgage market, it
had ready access to information regarding how the market priced loan products on any given
day. Using this information, we determined the initial prices at which WaMu could offer loans
to consumers by adding to the then-applicable market prices for private or agency mortgage-
backed securities, the (1) cost to hedge the loan pipeline, (2) cost to sell to the secondary market
and (3) cost to service and value of servicing the loans. Home Loans personnel would develop
the prices at which they could offer loans to consumers by adding their own costs of origination
and a margin.

The Conduit Program

From time to time, WMMSC purchased from other loan originators loans that were then
included in WaMu-sponsored securitizations. The goal of this conduit program was to purchase
loans from various loan originators and pool them together to create a securitization that was
attractive to the secondary market. WCC’s role in such securitization transactions was the same
as in those WCC-underwritten deals involving WaMu-originated loans: it helped construct and
negotiate the loan pools, conducted due diligence (through independent third parties), created
securitization structures attractive to investors (including by meeting their rating requirements),
and sold the securities.

Repurchase & Recovery

Your invitation asked specifically about the Repurchase and Recovery Team. In general,
purchasers of loans, whether the buyer in a whole loan sale or the trustee of a trust holding loans
underlying a securitization, can under certain circumstances demand that the seller of the loans
repurchase a loan. While I do not have a lawyer’s understanding of repurchase rights, I do know
that, under appropriate circumstances, a purchaser may demand that the seller repurchase a loan
on which the borrower fails to make a specified number of monthly payments owed (an early
payment default), for example, or when there has been an a breach of a representation or
warranty contained in the transaction documents for the loan sale or securitization. Like most
other aspects of the sale and securitization of home loans, the repurchase and recovery process is
filled with negotiation: buyers often take a very aggressive and expansive view of when a seller
is obligated to repurchase a loan, and sellers often disagree. In some cases, the seller convinces
the buyer that the seller is not obligated to repurchase the loan. In others, the seller agrees to
make the repurchase. In still others, it is the seller that identifies problems with a loan in the first
instance and initiates the repurchase process without demand from the buyer. Often the issue is
resolved short of repurchase (through correction of documentation problems or the payment of a
“make whole” amount, for example).

At some point in 2007 or 2008, the group at Washington Mutual responsible for evaluating and
responding to repurchase requests was placed under me. That group reviewed repurchase
requests to determine if they presented valid grounds for repurchase of the loan at issue, and then
responded to the requests accordingly. When appropriate, the group was also responsible for
making repurchase demands to those financial institutions from which WaMu or WMMSC had
acquired loans. The group, which came to be called the Repurchase and Recovery Team, also
created a computer modeling process to identify loans that might present a repurchase obligation.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?292974-2/washington-mutual-bank-failure-panel-2

Download Testimony (29k) - U.S. Senate Homeland Security and ...
www.hsgac.senate.gov/.../stmt-beck-david-april-13-2...
United States Senate  Opening Statement of David Beck. April 13, 2010. Permanent Subcommittee on


JPM: The Washington Mutual Story | The Big Picture

JPM: The Washington Mutual Story | The Big Picture

Top 510 Complaints and Reviews about Washington Mutual

Top 510 Complaints and Reviews about Washington Mutual

Supervision and Examination Manual – Version 2.0 > Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Supervision and Examination Manual – Version 2.0 > Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Submit a complaint > Consumer Financial Protection Bureau



TO SUBMIT A COMPLAINT AGAINST YOUR BANK WITH THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU GO TO THIS LINK:

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Ripoff Report | washington mutual directory of Complaints & Reviews





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JPMorgan Chase News, Photos and Videos - ABC News

JPMorgan Chase News, Photos and Videos - ABC News

Madoff said JPMorgan executives knew of his fraud: lawsuit | Reuters



(Reuters) - Two senior officials at JPMorgan Chase & Co and predecessor companies repeatedly confronted Bernard Madoff over irregularities in his business, a new lawsuit said, suggesting that bank leaders had "direct knowledge" of his Ponzi scheme.




The lawsuit filed in
federal court in Manhattan on Wednesday on behalf of shareholders
against Chief Executive Jamie Dimon and 12 other current and former
executives and directors was based in part by statements made by Madoff
himself during a series of interviews.



"JPMorgan was uniquely positioned for 20 years to see Madoff's crimes and put a stop to them," the lawsuit said. . . . . . . . . . .





Madoff said JPMorgan executives knew of his fraud: lawsuit | Reuters

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Foreclosure & Insurance Payments addressed in STEINBERGER v. HON. MCVEY/ONEWEST No. CV2010-054539




"¶96 While the alleged insurance payments are indeed speculative and unsupported, the assertion that the FDIC has already reimbursed OneWest for Steinberger’s default is not unsupported, based on the fact the Shared-Loss Agreement does appear to authorize such reimbursement. Under
A.R.S. § 47-3602, "an instrument is paid to the extent payment is made by or on behalf of a party obliged to pay the instrument and to a person entitled to enforce the instrument." Thus, if it is true that the FDIC has already reimbursed OneWest for all or part of Steinberger’s default,
OneWest may not be entitled to recover that amount from Steinberger. "


 READ THE RULING  AT     CA-SA12-0087.pdf












































Second JPMorgan Banker Jumps To His Death: Said To Be 33 Year Old Hong Kong FX Trader





JPMorgan's bankers are dropping like flies.  Why?


Second JPMorgan Banker Jumps To His Death: Said To Be 33 Year Old Hong Kong FX Trader

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Big Win for Florida Homeowner in Linda Zimmerman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA







On February 12, 2014 the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida Fourth District handed down a favorable decision for the homeowner in Linda Zimmerman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA.  Zimmerman has continued to fight Chase Pro se in the courts even though Chase had already sold her home at foreclosure.  Let us commend Zimmerman for her courage and perseverance in the face of all appearances.

Chase at the time their case was filed submitted a copy of a Washington Mutual Bank FA  note.  One year later Chase produced the purported original Note bearing an undated endorsement in blank.

The court ruled that JPMorgan Chase Bank NA "failed to submit any record evidence proving that it had the right to enforce the note on the date the complaint was filed." Chase must dismiss the instant lawsuit and refile.


The decision is as follows:
   
 

L