Tuesday, May 27, 2014

More Foreclosures, More Middle-aged Suicides

In this file photo, Aa sign is posted in front of a bank owned home that is for sale in Richmond, California. Photo: Justin Sullivan, Getty Images

More foreclosures, more middle-aged suicides, study finds

The sweeping, nationwide foreclosure crisis was a hallmark of the recession, and as the worst of the crash recedes, researchers are learning more about the economic and social ramifications of losing a home. Research has already established connections between foreclosures and a host of physical and psychological problems, as well as the relationship between unemployment and the suicide rate.
A new study by two sociology professors, Jason Houle at Dartmouth College and Michael Light at Purdue University, combines the two approaches for the first time.

The paper, from the June issue of the American Journal of Public Health, found that even when taking into account other socioeconomic factors such as unemployment, the higher a state's foreclosure rate, the higher the suicide rate.

The analysis shows a particularly strong connection between foreclosures and the suicide rates of the middle-aged, considered 46 to 64 years old in the study. That helps explain some changes that have been unique to the recent downturn.

"We have seen suicide rates go up in the recession, but that's not the big news," says Houle. He says the "real public health puzzle" is that the increase was really driven by the rise of suicide rates of the middle-aged.

Historically, the elderly were most likely to commit suicide, but for the first time since the data have been collected, the middle-aged recently surpassed the older group.

"It does look like rising home foreclosures explain a little less than 20 percent of the rise in suicide rates among the middle-aged," Houle says. That may be because that age group has the highest levels of homeownership, and "losing key assets and wealth close to retirement age is likely to have a profound effect on the mental health and well-being" of the middle-aged, the researchers wrote.
Houle and Light also looked at the effects of when homes are repossessed by banks. Repossessed properties can be a greater indicator of distress than the overall foreclosure rate, which can include less punitive resolutions like short sales.

When banks take back foreclosed homes, they're also responsible for maintaining the properties - which they have done with mixed success. If the bank-owned properties are poorly maintained, that could also have a stronger negative effect on the surrounding community, Houle says.

The connections between the repossession rate and the suicide rate are particularly strong. The analysis found a 5 percent increase in the rate of repossessions corresponds to a 25 percent increase in the suicide rates of the middle-aged.

For researchers, the crisis provides an ongoing - if unfortunate - source to learn from. Although the foreclosure rate is the lowest it's been since late 2008, it's still higher than normal.
Karen Weise is a Bloomberg writer. E-mail: kweise@bloomberg.net

More news for foreclosure suicides

  • Foreclosure Suicide - Huffington Post

    Anna Cuevas. Recent research concludes that there is a link between foreclosure rates and mental and physical health problems, as well as suicide attempts.
  • Anna Cuevas: Foreclosure Related Suicide on the Rise

    Jul 17, 2012 - Recent research concludes that there is a link between foreclosure rates and mental and physical health problems, as well as suicide attempts.
  • Foreclosures may be driving the rise in suicides

    The Washington Post
    May 19, 2014 - The foreclosure crisis increasingly looks like a public health crisis, too. Researchers have connected foreclosures to depression, stress-related ...
  • More Foreclosures Means More Suicides, Study Finds | Slog

    The Stranger
    4 hours ago - South Seattle woman Phyllis Walsh shot herself on her front lawn two days before her eviction last year, after she was foreclosed on by US ...
  • Foreclosure-Related Suicide: Sign of the Times? - ABC News

    abcnews.go.com › HealthDepression News
    ABC News
    Jul 25, 2008 - Is Foreclosure Suicide a Sign of Times? ... "By the time you foreclose on my house, I'll be dead." So read the note that 53-year-old Carlene ...
  • Death By Foreclosure | Crooks and Liars

    Crooks and Liars
    May 24, 2012 - There is no database that keeps track of foreclosure related suicides, and that is likely because it's difficult to label a death due to foreclosure ...
  • Over 300K home owner suicides attributed to foreclosures.

    Apr 25, 2014 - A reader recently asked us to check a social media meme with a striking statistic about foreclosures and suicides. It said, "1.4 million homes ...
  • Link Found Between Foreclosures & Suicides - Psych Central

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    1 day ago - Link Found Between Foreclosures and Suicides A new study finds that the recent U.S. foreclosure crisis has contributed significantly to the ...
  • More Foreclosures and Suicides than During the Great ...

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    May 17, 2013 - The San Francisco Chronicle notes that it is difficult to keep track of foreclosure rates now … let alone during the Great Depression: Foreclosure ...

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      Form ABS-15G2014-05-15
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      WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitizer, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted as depositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period.  On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB”) acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).  It is JPMCB’s position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bank remain with the FDIC receivership.  Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1 regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shall constitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any party relating to these assets.

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    Sunday, May 4, 2014

    Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Assert Claims Based on Breaches of PSAs

    Scholar Alert: [ "Glaski v. Bank of America" ] Case Law

    Tran v. Bank of New York

    Dist. Court, SD New York, 2014
    The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is predicated upon alleged breaches of the PSAs which, the Plaintiffs allege, made the assignment of their mortgage loans by the original lending institution to the Trustee Defendants invalid.


    A. The Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Assert Claims Based on Breaches of the PSAs

    The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is predicated upon alleged breaches of the PSAs which, the Plaintiffs allege, made the assignment of their mortgage loans by the original lending institution to the Trustee Defendants invalid. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 21.) With full knowledge of the invalidity of this transfer, the Trustee Defendants allegedly "concealed" from the Plaintiffs the fact that they did not validly own the mortgage loans and sought to foreclose on certain of the Plaintiffs' properties, in violation of RICO and as part of a conspiracy to violate RICO. (Id. ¶¶ 35-54.) In their motion, the Trustee Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs are neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the PSAs, and therefore lack standing to assert claims based on breaches of those agreements. (Defs.' Mot. at 5.) This argument has merit. Even construing the Amended Complaint in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs' standing to bring this action is lacking based on a careful review of the entire record. Therefore, the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

    The PSAs here are to be interpreted under the New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law ("EPTL"). (Pls.' 11/6/13 Letter, Ex. 3 § 10.03 (New York law governs the interpretation of the PSA); Pls.' Opp'n at 10; Defs.' Reply at 2.) New York courts interpreting the EPTL consistently hold that litigants who are not beneficiaries of a trust lack standing to enforce the trust's terms or to challenge the actions of the trustee. See In re Estate of McManus, 390 N.E.2d 773, 774 (N.Y. 1979) (individuals "not beneficially interested" in a trust lack standing to challenge the trustee's actions); Cashman v. Petrie, 201 N.E.2d 24, 26 (N.Y. 1964) ("A person who might incidentally benefit from the performance of a trust but is not a beneficiary thereof cannot maintain a suit to enforce the trust or to enjoin a breach."); Naversen v. Gaillard, 831 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) ("The Supreme Court properly determined that since the defendants were not beneficiaries of the G. Everett Gaillard Revocable Trust, they lacked standing to challenge the actions of the plaintiff as its trustee.").

    The Amended Complaint does not allege that the Plaintiffs were parties to the PSAs, (see generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-59), and the representative PSA provided by the Plaintiffs for the Court's review does not include any provision indicative of a party status for borrowers or mortgagors. (See generally Pls.' 11/6/13 Letter Ex.3.) Though the Second Circuit has not ruled directly on this issue, district courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have generally held that "a nonparty to a PSA lacks standing to assert noncompliance with the PSA as a claim or defense unless the non-party is an intended (not merely incidental) third-party beneficiary of the PSA."[7] Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 10 Civ. 7531 (LTS), 2013 WL 1285160, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing, inter alia, Livonia Property Holdings, LLC v. 12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 724, 736-37 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ("For over a century, state and federal courts around the country have [held] that a litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge that assignment."), aff'd, 399 F. App'x 97 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Karamath v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 1557 (RML), 2012 WL 4327613, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (mortgagor "is not a party to the PSA or to the Assignment of Mortgage, and is not a third-party beneficiary or either, and therefore has no standing to challenge the validity of that agreement or the assignment") adopted by No. 11 Civ. 1557 (NGG), 2012 WL 4327502 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2012). These cases have further held that for a party to be considered a third-party beneficiary to a PSA, the intent to render a non-party a third-party beneficiary must be clear from the face of the PSA. Rajamin, 2013 WL 1285160, at *3 (internal citations omitted).

    In an effort to establish their standing in the face of this case law, the Plaintiffs argue that the breaches of the PSAs, specifically, the transfers of ownership after the closing dates specified in the PSAs, rendered the conveyances void under Section 7-2.4 of the EPTL. (Pls.' Opp'n at 9.) That section provides that "if the trust is expressed in the instrument creating the estate of the trustee, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as authorized by this article and by any other provision of law, is void." EPTL § 7-2.4. The Plaintiffs argue first that the conveyances are void under EPTL § 7-2.4, and, second, that because the conveyances are void under that section, they have standing, even as non-parties, to challenge the assignments. (Pls.' Opp'n at 7.)

    First, though some courts have held that non-compliance with the terms of a PSA renders an assignment void under EPTL § 7-2.4, the weight of the case law holds that such an assignment is merely voidable, and therefore outside the scope of that section. A void contract is "invalid or unlawful from its inception," while a voidable contract "is one where one or more of the parties have the power, by the manifestation of an election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 169. The Plaintiffs cite two cases that found that acceptance of the note and mortgage by a trustee after the closing date of the PSA renders an assignment void under EPTL § 7-2.4. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, No. 31648/2009, 2013 WL 1831799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 29, 2013); Glaski v. Bank of America, Nat'l Ass'n, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (relying on Erobobo).

    However, those cases run counter to better-reasoned cases, which apply the rule that a beneficiary can ratify a trustee's ultra vires act. See Mooney v. Madden, 597 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) ("A trustee may bind the trust to an otherwise invalid act or agreement which is outside the scope of the trustee's power when the beneficiary or beneficiaries consent or ratify the trustee's ultra vires act or agreement."); Washburn v. Ranier, 149 A.D. 800, 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912) (same); 106 N.Y. Jur. 2d Trusts § 431 ("the trustee may bind trust to an otherwise invalid act or agreement which is outside the scope of the trustee's power when beneficiary consents to or ratifies the trustee's ultra vires act or agreement"). Where an act can be ratified, it is voidable rather than void. See Hackett v. Hackett, No. 3338/2008, 2012 WL669525, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) ("A void contract cannot be ratified; it binds no one and is a nullity. However, an agreement that is merely voidable by one party leaves both parties at liberty to ratify the transaction and insist upon its performance.") (internal citation omitted). Notably, trust beneficiaries need not actually ratify the act to render an act voidable and therefore outside the scope of EPTL § 7-2.4, rather, the fact that trust beneficiaries could ratify such an act is sufficient to render it voidable. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n v. Bassman FBT, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).

    Applied to the context of alleged non-compliance with the terms of a PSA, courts considering EPTL § 7-2.4 have held that "even if it is true that the Notes were transferred to the trust in violation of the trust's terms [after the closing date of the trust], that transaction could be ratified by the beneficiaries of the trust and is therefore merely voidable." Omrazeti v. Aurora Bank FSB, No. SA:12-CV-00730-DAE, 2013 WL 3242520, at *7 (W.D. Tex. June 25, 2013); see also Calderon, 941 F.Supp.2d at 766 (same); Bassman, 981 N.E.2d at 944 ("Hence, numerous cases, including several that specifically reference 7-2.4...indicate that under various circumstances a trustee's ultra vires acts are not void."). Following this case law, even assuming that the transfer of Plaintiffs' mortgages to their respective trusts violated the terms of their respective PSAs, the after the deadline transactions would merely be voidable at the election of one or more of the parties—not void.

    Furthermore, even if the allegedly untimely conveyances were to be considered void under EPTL § 7-2.4, district courts in the Second Circuit have found that that section does not provide standing to mortgagors to challenge the conveyances. In Karamath, the plaintiff-mortgagor alleged that the trustee defendant had no legal or equitable interest in her loan because the assignment of the note was invalid, and the transfer was void under the EPTL. Karamath, 2012 WL 4327613, at *7. The Eastern District nevertheless held that because the plaintiff was not a party to the PSA or to the Assignment of Mortgage, and was not a third-party beneficiary of either, she therefore had no standing to challenge the validity of that agreement or the assignment.[8] Id.; see also Rajamin, 2013 WL 1285160, at *3 ("Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that would support plausibly a claim that they are intended third-party beneficiaries of the PSAs. Thus, Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Defendants' alleged ownership of the Notes and [Deeds of Trust] or authority to foreclose based on non-compliance with the PSAs.").

    Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that whether or not they are intended third-party beneficiaries of the PSAs is a "fact-laden issue" that cannot be determined within the context of the Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Pls.' Opp'n at 19.) However, Plaintiffs bear the burden to plead facts showing their intended third-party beneficiary status. Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2009); Rajamin, 2013 WL 1285160, at *3. The Plaintiffs do not make any such factual allegations in the Amended Complaint. (See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-59.) Moreover, the Plaintiffs can only attain status as intended third-party beneficiaries if the PSAs themselves "clearly evidence[] an intent to permit enforcement" by them. Premium Mortg, 583 F.3d at 108 (quoting Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 485 N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 1985)). The Plaintiffs point to no such provisions, and the Court's independent search has discovered none. (See generally Pls.' 11/6/13 Letter Ex.3.) While the Plaintiffs' Opposition argues that the PSAs place duties upon mortgage loan servicers to safeguard the Plaintiffs' properties from such perils as physical destruction and tax forfeiture, (Pls.' Opp'n at 19-20), the Plaintiffs fail to explain how such provisions would be intended to benefit them, as opposed to the RMBS certificateholders, for whom the Plaintiffs' properties constitute collateral securing their investment. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they are intended third-party beneficiaries of the PSAs, and they therefore lack standing to bring claims based on alleged breaches of those agreements.

    For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs have no standing to bring any claim based on alleged breaches of the PSAs, and, because the theory underlying the Plaintiffs' claims is untenable, any amendment of the Amended Complaint would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Therefore, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. Furthermore, because the standing issue is dispositive, this Court need not reach the other issues raised in the motion to dismiss or the issue of severance.


    For the reasons discussed herein, the Defendants' joint motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to close this case.