Friday, December 27, 2013

“Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.” and “Washington Mutual Bank” Were Used For Different Purposes….Primarily Fraud.

For the past few years, people have been trying to make the argument (including myself) that “Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.” (WaMu, F.A.) changed its name to ”Washington Mutual Bank” (WMB) and ceased to exist after April 4, 2005. After all, this is what WMI disclosed in its 10-K filing for fiscal 2005 and testified to in its bankruptcy proceedings.

But when challenged with this argument in foreclosure proceedings throughout the U.S., JPMorgan Chase proffers the following document in an attempt to show that both these entities did in fact merge into one, but that WMB was allowed to use the name WaMu, F.A. as a d/b/a (“doing business as.”)

wamu fa ots snip 2

Though they may have “slipped a fast one” on their comatose regulators, these entities clearly served different purposes after the filing of this document. Having investigated cases involving WaMu, F.A. and WMB for several years now, I have accumulated a substantial amount of evidence to show that they were not acting as one in the same. For example, here is a recorded mortgage assignment in 2007 from WaMu, F.A. to WMB for the “consideration” amount of “$1.00.” Notice how both entities use the same address.
FA to WMB assignment - snip

This is prime facie evidence that these entities were acting separate from one another. In addition,  I have documents produced in discovery showing that the WaMu, F.A. entity was acting as (and calling itself) a “Premiere Mortgage Broker.”

Washington Mutual increased its origination of ”Combo Loans,” also referred to as  “80/20,” “80/10,” or “90/10″ loans, from April 4, 2005 thru 2007. The first number of the combo represents the 1st position lien and its percentage of the home’s value (i.e 80 means 80% of the “LTV” [loan-to-value].) The second number represents the simultaneous 2nd position lien and percentage of the home’s value (i.e. 80/10 means the 2nd loan equals 10% of the home’s value for a “collective loan-to-value” ["CLTV"] amount of 90%.)

For those of you who took out one of these simultaneous ”Combo Loans” with Washington Mutual during this time period, you will probably notice that the first position lien states WaMu, F.A. as the “Lender” whereas the 2nd position lien shows WMB as the “Lender.” Now if these entities were in fact the same, then why the use of different names on the documents when the loans closed simultaneously? The answer is simple. WaMu, F.A. was routinely selling the first position liens into the secondary market for purposes of securitization. But, if you read any of the “Pooling & Servicing Agreements” for WaMu trusts during this period, the “Seller” is almost always named as “Washington Mutual Bank” rather than “Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.” What this means is, like the assignment above, WaMu, F.A. had to first sell the loan to WMB before WMB could sell into the securitization chain. The chain of title would go from WaMu, F.A. to WMB (then questionably) to “Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.” ………..the Trust.

The use of WaMu, F.A. was a way to collect undisclosed “Yield Spread Premiums” by calling itself a “Federal Savings Bank” rather than a broker. WaMu, F.A. could then charge additional fees when selling the loans to its alter-ego, WMB. As part of the Washington Mutual securitization fraud scheme, it is also well known and documented that misrepresentations were made to investors regarding the loans that were sold. One of the most common misrepresentations I see when analyzing the internal loan level data is the “Loan-To-Value” percentages being represented to the investors on these “Combo Loans.” For example, on a “80/20″ combo loan, the data will show the loan was originated to reflect 80% of the property’s value (LTV = 80%) with the “collective loan-to-value” (CLTV) field also showing 80% rather than 100%. This is fraudulent as the investors were lead to believe that the home had 20% equity or that the borrower put down 20% if it was a purchase loan. This is the type of fraud upon the investors that results in a 13B settlement by JPMorgan Chase with the Department of Justice.
Thus, a word to the wise – Do not fall for the presumption that “Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.” and “Washington Mutual Bank” were the same entities after April 4, 2005. They served entirely different purposes for a reason…..primarily fraud. Just because the regulators didn’t catch this, or chose to ignore this, doesn’t mean it was legal.

“Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.” and “Washington Mutual Bank” Were Used For Different Purposes….Primarily Fraud.

Time To Challenge Those Trustee’s Deeds

Time To Challenge Those Trustee’s Deeds

For the past couple of years, I have been providing clients with the internal loan level accounting data, which reveals in most instances of private securitization, that all payments “due” on the notes have been paid regularly by undisclosed “co-obligors.” Thus there becomes an issue of fact as to whether or not the “note” is actually in “default.” Word through the grapevine is that this particular argument is gaining some momentum in certain jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Well now it’s time to use the same internal accounting data to attack those dubious “Trustee’s Deeds.” In non-judicial foreclosure states, a ”Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” or Trustee’s Deed” is recorded after the foreclosure sale. Often, the property is sold back to the supposed creditor into what is called “REO” status. In cases where the subject loans were alleged to have been securitized, the Trustee’s Deed will typically state that the Trustee for “XYZ Mortgage-Backed Trust” was the “highest bidder” at the sale and paid cash in the amount of $………..(whatever dollar figure.) There are many reasons to question the validity of these documents; such as the actual parties submitting the “credit bids,” and whether or not any actual cash exchanged hands as attested to under notary acknowledgment. However, there is a way to provide evidence and proof that no such payment ever exchanged hands.

The following language was extracted from a typical Trustee’s Deed:
Trustees Deed language snip
In this particular case, the alleged amount owed in the “Notice of Default” was roughly $314,000.00. A check of the internal accounting for this particular loan (6-months after the sale) shows the loan in “REO” status with no such payment having ever been applied. In fact, the certificateholders (investors) are still receiving their monthly payments of P&I with the trust showing “zero” losses.

This is good hard evidence that the sale and subsequent Trustee’s Deed filed in this case was a “sham” transaction.

If your loan was alleged to have been securitized by a private mbs trust, and your home sold in similar fashion with a recorded Trustee’s Deed, contact me today ( to see if your Trustee’s Deed matches up with the internal accounting data. I will now be offering Expert Affidavits showing what was stated in the Trustee’s Deed as opposed to what has actually occurred behind the curtains. In order to evaluate your particular trustee’s deed, I need to see it, along with a copy of the note.

It’s time to challenge those Trustee’s Deeds!

Bill Paatalo -
Private Investigator – Oregon PSID# 49411
BP Investigative Agency

Time To Challange Those Trustee’s Deeds

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

What JPMorgan Chase Wants to Keep Out of the Public


Hurry before it's gone!!

Sunday, December 8, 2013

Small Town Judge – Major Ethics Issues – Plots Against Homeowner with Bank’s Attorney | Deadly Clear

Small Town Judge – Major Ethics Issues – Plots Against Homeowner with Bank’s Attorney | Deadly Clear


Have you ever felt that the judge in your case was not treating you or your attorney fairly, especially when the facts of bankster fraud were clear? Or when you have shown the judge a fabricated assignment of mortgage and an obviously fake endorsement on your so-called note? When you walk into the courtroom does your stomach sink and you imagine you hear a faint theme from the wicked witch of the west in the Wizard of Oz?

In a small Kentucky county, a homeowner just like you encountered the unthinkable – proof that his judge was prejudice and even worse – the judge was assisting the opposing counsel for the bank in a plot against him.  . . . . . .