Wednesday, January 25, 2012


Have the Banksters been BLINDSIDED?

If so, this will be the biggest MOVE 
since the last council meeting on "Survivor".

Obama Is Announcing A Brand New Group To Go After Fraud That Caused The Financial Crisis

Joe Weisenthal | Jan. 24, 2012, 8:28 PM | 93 | 4
Eric Schneidermen
It's possible that this will be the biggest news to come out of the State Of The Union.
During his State of the Union address tonight, President Obama will announce the creation of a special unit to investigate misconduct and illegalities that contributed to both the financial collapse and the mortgage crisis.
The office, part of a new Unit on Mortgage Origination and Securitization Abuses, will be chaired by Eric Schneiderman, the New York attorney general, according to a White House official.
The lack of a pursuit of pre-crisis "crimes" remains a big, public frustration. We have no idea if this will go anywhere, but obviously this shows that The White House is still aware of this issue, and also shows that it likely wants to put Wall Street on trial (figuratively and perhaps literally) in the runup to the election.
Read more:
"If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich."

Monday, January 23, 2012


Victory Over Foreclosure: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST v. BRUMBAUGH, Supreme...: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST v. BRUMBAUGH 2012 OK 3 Case Number: 109223 Decided: 01/17/2012 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ...


2012 OK 3
Case Number: 109223
Decided: 01/17/2012

DENNIS BRUMBAUGH, Defendant/Appellant.
¶0 The Plaintiff /Appellee, Deutsche Bank National Trust as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan 2002-1, filed this foreclosure action against the Defendant/Appellant, Dennis Brumbaugh. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. Defendant contends there is not enough evidence to show Plaintiff has standing. Plaintiff asserts it is the holder of the note and has standing. We find there are material issues of fact that need to be determined and summary judgment is not appropriate.
Phillip A. Taylor, TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant.
Ray E. Zschiesche, PHILLIPS MURRAH P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
¶1 This is an appeal from a foreclosure action initiated by Appellee, Deutsche Bank National Trust As Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan 2002-1 (Appellee) against Appellant Dennis Brumbaugh (Appellant) and others. Appellant and his wife, Debra Brumbaugh, (Brumbaughs) executed a note and mortgage with Long Beach Mortgage Company on February 27, 2002. On December 27, 2006, the Brumbaughs entered into a loan modification agreement with U.S. Bank, N.A., successor trustee to Wachovia Bank, N.A. (formerly known as First Union National Bank), as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1, Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2002-1 in trust for the benefit of the Certificateholders. On July 20, 2007, the Brumbaughs divorced, and in 2008, Debra Brumbaugh executed a quitclaim deed to Dennis Brumbaugh.
¶2 Appellant defaulted on the note in January 2009, and Appellee filed its petition for foreclosure on June 2, 2009. Attached to the petition was a copy of the note, mortgage, loan modification agreement, and copies of statements of judgments and liens by other entities. Appellee claims it is the present holder of the note and mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgage servicing transfer. The Appellant answered, denying Appellee owns any interest in the note and mortgage, and the copies attached to the petition were not the same as those he signed. He claims Appellee lacked capacity to sue and the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also denied being in default and asserted the Appellee/servicing agent caused the alleged default.
¶3 On April 1, 2010, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was an affidavit from an employee of JP Morgan Chase Bank (Chase) as the servicing agent for Appellee. The affidavit states the Appellee is the current owner and holder of the original note, mortgage, and the modification agreements. However, there is no mention of when Appellee became the holder.
¶4 Appellant asserts in his response to the motion for summary judgment that Appellee failed to prove the affiant is a competent witness and no documentation was presented that connects Appellant to Appellee. The note attached to the petition and the motion did not show it had been negotiated to any other party including Appellee. Negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-201(b). He asserts because there is no indorsement whatsoever by Long Beach Mortgage Company attached to the petition and motion for summary judgment, Appellee cannot be the holder of the note. Therefore, Appellant asserts Appellee cannot be the real party in interest. However, in Appellee's reply to Appellant's response to the motion for summary judgment and at the hearing, a copy of the note with a blank, undated indorsement signed by Long Beach Mortgage Company was attached and presented.
¶5 Appellee asserts that even if negotiation of the note was at issue, Appellee has possession of the note and that satisfies the "negotiation" requirements of 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-201. Further, the Chase affiant has personal knowledge because he reviewed and examined the account files and Chase is the servicing agent for Appellee. Appellee further asserts, it has the original note and mortgage, and is therefore, the real party in interest.
¶6 The trial court reviewed the note presented at the hearing and agreed with Appellee that Appellee was the holder of the note because it had possession of the note and it was indorsed in blank. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee on January 27, 2011.
¶7 An appeal on summary judgment comes to this court as a de novo review. Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. All inferences and conclusions are to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the record and are to be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment. Rose v. Sapulpa Rural Water Co., 1981 OK 85, 621 P.2d 752. Summary judgment is improper if, under the evidentiary materials, reasonable individuals could reach different factual conclusions. Gaines v. Comanche County Medical Hospital, 2006 OK 39, ¶4, 143 P.3d 203, 205.
¶8 The Uniform Commercial Code adopted in Oklahoma, 12A O.S. 2001, § 1-101 et seq., defines who is a "person entitled to enforce" the note (instrument).1 A "person entitled to enforce" the note requires possession of the note with a very limited exception.2 It will be either one who is a "holder" of the note or a "nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder."3
¶9 Appellee must demonstrate it is a person entitled to enforce the note. It must provide evidence it has possession of the note either by being a holder or a nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder. Appellee attached to its Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment a copy of the note with a blank indorsement from Long Beach Mortgage Company. Appellee states this allonge4 was inadvertently omitted from the copy of the note that was attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment. However, this allonge was not attached to the Petition for Foreclosure of Mortgage. Appellee is trying to establish it is a "holder" of the note. Evidence establishing when Appellee became a person entitled to enforce the note must show Appellee was a person entitled to enforce the note prior to filing its cause of action for foreclosure.
¶10 Appellant argues Appellee does not have standing to bring this foreclosure action. The issue presented to this Court is standing. This Court has previously held:
Standing, as a jurisdictional question, may be correctly raised at any level of the judicial process or by the Court on its own motion. This Court has consistently held that standing to raise issues in a proceeding must be predicated on interest that is "direct, immediate and substantial." Standing determines whether the person is the proper party to request adjudication of a certain issue and does not decide the issue itself. The key element is whether the party whose standing is challenged has sufficient interest or stake in the outcome.
Matter of the Estate of Doan, 1986 OK 15, ¶7, 727 P.2d 574, 576. In Hendrick v. Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 4, 865 P.2d 1232, 1234, this Court also held:
Respondent challenges Petitioner's standing to bring the tendered issue. Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. It may be raised as an issue at any stage of the judicial process by any party or by the court sua sponte. (emphasis original)
Furthermore, in Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, footnote 19, 163 P.3d 512, 519, this Court stated "[s]tanding may be raised at any stage of the judicial process or by the court on its own motion." Additionally in Fent, this Court stated:
Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. The three threshold criteria of standing are (1) a legally protected interest which must have been injured in fact- i.e., suffered an injury which is actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) a causal nexus between the injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision. The doctrine of standing ensures a party has a personal stake in the outcome of a case and the parties are truly adverse.
Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, ¶7, 163 P.3d 512, 519-520. In essence, a plaintiff who has not suffered an injury attributable to the defendant lacks standing to bring a suit. And, thus, "standing [must] be determined as of the commencement of suit." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570, n.5, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L.Ed. 351 (1992).
¶11 To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing. Gill v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 1945 OK 181, 159 P.2d 717.5 Being a person entitled to enforce the note is an essential requirement to initiate a foreclosure lawsuit. In the present case, there is a question of fact as to when Appellee became a holder, and thus, a person entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate. If Deutsche Bank became a person entitled to enforce the note as either a holder or nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder after the foreclosure action was filed, then the case may be dismissed without prejudice and the action may be re-filed in the name of the proper party. We reverse the granting of summary judgment by the trial court and remand back for further determinations as to when Appellee acquired its interest in the note.
¶12 It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note, and have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of the note, so the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. This is accomplished by establishing that the party is a holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-309 or 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-418. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-301. Likewise, for the homeowners, absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, the dismissal cannot cancel their obligation arising from an authenticated note, or loan modification, or insulate them from foreclosure proceedings based on proven delinquency. See, U.S. Bank National Association v. Kimball 27 A.3d 1087, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 100, 2011 VT 81 (VT 2011); and Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 78 A.D.3d 895, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2010).
¶13 CONCUR: TAYLOR (This Court's decision in no way releases or exonerates the debt owed by the defendants on this home.), C.J., KAUGER (joins Taylor, C.J.), WATT, WINCHESTER (joins Taylor, C.J.), EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, GURICH (joins Taylor, C.J.), JJ.
1 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-301.
2 A person who is not reasonably able to obtain possession of the note because it was lost, destroyed, in the wrongful possession of another, or it is paid or accepted by mistake. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-301.
3 A holder is a person in possession of the note that is payable either to bearer (blank indorsement) or to an identified person (special indorsement) that is the person in possession. 12A O.S. 2001, §§ 1-201(b)(21), 3-204 and 3-205. A "nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder" is a person in possession of the note but the note was not indorsed by the previous holder; special indorsement or blank indorsement. No negotiation has occurred because the person now in possession did not become a holder by lack of the note being indorsed as mentioned. An example would be when a sale of notes in bulk is made by the holder to a transferee and the holder is transferring the right to enforce the notes even though there has been no negotiation. (See the REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES (NOVEMBER 14, 2011)). Negotiation is the voluntary or involuntary transfer of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-201. Transfer occurs when the instrument is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203. Delivery of the note would still have to occur even though there is no negotiation. Delivery is defined as the voluntary transfer of possession. 12A O.S. 2001, § 1-201(b)(15). The transferee would then be vested with any right of the transferor to enforce the note. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203(b). Some jurisdictions have held that without holder status and therefore the presumption of a right to enforce, the possessor of the note must demonstrate both the fact of the delivery and the purpose of the delivery of the note to the transferee in order to qualify as the person entitled to enforce. In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 912 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
4According to Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) an allonge is "[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements." See, 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-204(a).
5 This opinion occurred prior to the enactment of the UCC and as explained in footnote 3 of this opinion, the person entitled to enforce the note in almost all situations is required to be in possession of the note and therefore if the owner of the note is not in possession of the note it is not a person entitled to enforce the note. (See the REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES (NOVEMBER 14, 2011)).

Bank's Status as "Holder in Due Course" Under UCC

Excerpted from:


888 S.W.2d 860 (1994)




No. 05-93-00911-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

September 27, 1994.

B. Negotiable Instruments—Sum Certain Requirement

Article Three of the Texas Business and Commerce Code sets out the requisites for the negotiability of an instrument. See TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); Hinckley v. Eggers,587 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A negotiable instrument, such as a note, is a writing signed by the maker, containing an "unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money, on demand or at a definite time, to order or to bearer." See TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 3.104. A variable-rate promissory note with an interest rate that is determined by reference to a bank's published prime rate is a promise to pay a sum certain and, if it meets the other requirements of negotiability, is a negotiable instrument. See TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 3.104; Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee,831 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1992). However, the term "bank's published prime rate" includes "only those rates which are public, either known to or readily ascertainable by any interested person." Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 797-98.

One reason for the "sum certain" requirement is to provide "commercial certainty" in the transfer of negotiable instruments. See Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 796. Commercial certainty serves one of the purposes of the law of negotiable instruments: to make negotiable instruments the functional equivalent of money. See id.

C. Holders in Due Course—Texas Law
To meet the technical requirements of Texas law for holder-in-due-course status, a holder of a negotiable instrument must (1) take the instrument for value, (2) in good faith, and (3) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person. TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 3.302(a) (Tex.UCC) (Vernon 1968). If the holder acquires the instrument with notice that it is past due, the holder is not a holder in due course. See TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 3.302(a)(3) (Tex.UCC) (Vernon 1968).

D. Federal Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine

The FDIC and its successors may be holders in due course under federal common law without meeting the technical state-law requirements for holder-in-due-course status. See NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Campise,788 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The federal holder-in-due-course doctrine bars makers of negotiable instruments from asserting personal defenses to liability against the FDIC where the FDIC acquires the instrument by purchase and assumption from a troubled financial institution. See FDIC v. Byrne,736 F.Supp. 727, 730 (N.D.Tex.1990); Beach v. RTC,821 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The federal holder-in-due-course doctrine also precludes assertion of personal defenses against a transferee of the FDIC that acquires a negotiable instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of any defense.See Byrne, 736 F.Supp. at 730. The federal holder-in-due-course doctrine does not apply regarding nonnegotiable instruments. See
[ 888 S.W.2d 865 ]

Sunbelt Savings, FSB v. Montross,923 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir.1991), opinion reinstated in part,944 F.2d 227, 228 (1991) (en banc); Stiles v. RTC,831 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992), rev'd on other grounds,867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.1993); cf. Beach, 821 S.W.2d at 244 (doctrine did not apply to judgment transferred from FDIC).
 Go to:

Updated List of Robo-Signers from Salem, Massachusetts Office of Deeds
This site lists 3 pages of names of "Approved Robo-signers" who are foreclosing on properties in Massachusetts and elsewhere.  Take a look.  It could be helpful to you.

Why Are No Banksters Facing Criminal Prosecution

The state Attorney Generals and the Obama administration have been working on a settlement to resolve foreclosure fraud issues which would cost the banks up to $25 billion. This money would supposedly go to help distressed homeowners. However, to put this in perspective, according to CoreLogic, homeowners are now $750 billion under water!

As we know, the top bank execs responsible for managing the home loan industry have yet to be indicted and prosecuted for crimes that have rocked the financial world off its axis and caused untold suffering by millions of people. This article titled "Top Justice officials connected to mortgage banks" says it all.

In recent weeks the Justice Department has come under renewed pressure from members of Congress, state and local officials and homeowners' lawyers to open a wide-ranging criminal investigation of mortgage servicers, the biggest of which have been Covington clients. So far Justice officials haven't responded publicly to any of the requests.

While Holder and Breuer were partners at Covington, the firm's clients included the four largest U.S. banks - Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo & Co - as well as at least one other bank that is among the 10 largest mortgage servicers.

The full article which is a must read is at -

Also check out

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

JPMorgan Chase Accused of Brazen Bankruptcy Fraud

 LOS ANGELES (CN) - JPMorgan Chase routinely fabricated documents to deceive bankruptcy judges, going so far as to Photoshop documents to "create the illusion" of standing "in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases," according to a federal class action.

     Lead plaintiff Ernest Michael Bakenie claims that Chase's "pattern and practice of playing 'hide-and-seek' with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players" bore rich fruit: that Chase secured motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim in 95 percent of its cases.

     "Through the use of fabricated assignments, endorsements and affidavits that purport to transfer deeds of trust, notes and the rights to all monies due under the terms of tens of thousands of non-negotiable promissory notes (the 'MLNs'); Chase has demonstrated a pattern and practice of playing 'hide-and-seek' with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players," the complaint states.

     "Chase intentionally conceals the identity of the true parties in interest entitled to enforce the tens of tens of thousands of residential non-negotiable promissory notes (the 'MLNs') for its own financial benefit, at the expense of the class and to the detriment of the integrity of the bankruptcy system."

     Bakenie says Chase used a network of attorneys to file more than 7,000 motions for relief from automatic stay in bankruptcy cases in the Central District of California, "wherein they falsely claim to be the party entitled to monies due under the terms of MLNs."

     Chase rewards attorneys based on how quickly they can secure the stays, and uses fabricated documents to establish chain of title on loans, according to the complaint.

     "Rather than incur the cost of 'proving up' its own standing or the standing of its principal Mortgage Backed Security Trust, Chase systemically misrepresents Chase or a designated MBST to be a creditor in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases by utilizing manufactured documents," the complaint states.

     Bakenie claims: "That said practice is utilized for all mortgage loans originated by Chase, and other loan originators, including insolvent Washington Mutual Bank, whose assets were purchased by Chase.

     "That said manufactured documents are fabrications intended to create the illusion of a valid transfers MLNs and support the assertion of standing in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases. ...

     "That the aforementioned fabricated evidence is 'photo-shopped' and is highly persuasive and authentic in appearance so as to ensure legal victory in the bankruptcy courts.

     "That said manufactured evidence is systemically utilized to deceive bankruptcy players and increase the profits of Chase, its agents and its principals through massive cost savings and the imposition of attorney fees upon class borrowers.

     "As a direct result of this practice, over 95 percent of Chase's motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim are granted without objection.

     "That the use of the fabricated evidence has a chilling effect on class debtors and their attorneys. Said business practices discourages bankruptcy players from offering objections or from questioning the validity of Chase's false claims based on standing."

     Bakenie adds: "That said practice allows Chase to dump defaulted loans that were never properly securitized by WAMU and other originators acquired by Chase into private mortgage backed security trusts by creating the illusion of a valid transfer.

     "Said practice shifts the liability of defaulted loans not properly securitized by WAMU, from Chase to private mortgage backed security trusts. The practice allows Chase to effectively mitigate the millions of dollars in liability of the WAMU acquisition, where WAMU failed to transfer MLNs of its portfolio before its demise. Said practice shifts losses from WAMU to MBST bond investors.

     "That after a non-judicial foreclosure sale, class members remain indebted to the true beneficiary for the unsecured note but without credit for the loss of the collateral to Chase's designated assignee.

     "Most egregiously, the network attorneys utilize the inducing documents to obtain attorney fees awards from by the bankruptcy judges ranging from $600-$1,000 for each successful motion for relief of stay."

     Bakenie concludes that "degradation of the integrity of our bankruptcy court system cannot be justified in the name of Chase's cost savings and unjust enrichment."

     Bakenie seeks class certification, disgorgement, compensatory, statutory and punitive damages for unfair and deceptive trade, and "an order vacating all bankruptcy orders, claims and awards granted based on Chase's misrepresentation and deceptive business practices".

     He is represented by Joseph Arthur Roberts of Newport Beach. 

Thursday, January 12, 2012


Link to the full revealing article:     WASHINGTON MUTUAL'S GORY AUTOPSY 

Published with permission from the author, Rob Harrington.  The content of this article reflects the personal opinions of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.






Washington Mutual’s Gory Autopsy:

A Disturbing Crime Scene (Part 1)

In, or around 2005, JP Morgan Chase (JPMC) entered “negotiations” with Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) to purchase the bank and its various subsidiaries. Years later, substantial information regarding this questionable business deal between the OTS, FDIC, and JPMC, was provided in great detail in one particular lawsuit (WaMu Bondholders vs. JPMC and the FDIC(1) (as specifically referred to as the "Texas Complaint" or "Texas Action.") In 2005, Steve Rotella became the new COO of WaMu. Rotella, a senior long term executive from JPMC, went to WaMu with other senior level executives, (including John Berens,) to learn the "WaMu way." This team was sent to provide pre-sale information to JPMC regarding the “potential purchase” of WaMu. Jamie Dimon admits that he had long coveted WaMu's retail banking foot print, especially on the West Coast and Southeast of the United States. Moreover, JPMC was also interested in WaMu's expansive lending operations. WaMu was to become the largest bank failure ever. It was later alleged in April 2008, at a WaMu shareholder meeting, that Steve Rotella was blamed for the company’s troubles.
According to the Misery Index blog, 10/17/08, “At a stockholders meeting in April, 2008, a man who identified himself as a WaMu employee and shareholder laid the blame for the company's troubles squarely on Stephen Rotella, president and chief operating officer since 2005.”
The general allegations are that a numerous number of other JPMC transplants, who followed Rotella and Berens in the subsequent years, “ran WaMu off the cliff.” WAS THIS DELIBERATE or ACCIDENTAL -as one could follow the money many years later?
The National WaMu Homeowners Support Group (NWHSG) believes upon over 3 years of research with hundreds of allegedly defrauded WaMu homeowners, JPMC executives (turned WaMu executives) perhaps intentionally created a fraudulent scheme within WaMu to utilize "lax and irresponsible" underwriting(2) to built a vast profit center from the mortgage loan business. In this alleged scheme, JPMC and its related companies, could later control the sale of potentially 100,000's of WaMu’s foreclosed homes. The NWHSG also discovered that WaMu/JPMC ex-employees(?) had established Home Sales, Inc. “related” companies around the country, between the years of 2005-2006. Home Sales Inc. of Delaware, is a “related” company to Chase Home Finance “companies,” yet, another subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.. Homesales Inc. of Delaware would later prove to be a specially chosen REO Disposition Company of WaMu's successfully foreclosed homes. The peculiar massive number of foreclosed homes would later be found to be the result, in many instances, of fraudulently underwritten home loans, unfair and deceptive loan servicing tactics, and questionable legal and property transfer strategies.

Our NATIONAL WAMUHOMEOWNERS SUPPORT GROUP.COM ( research and other investigations confirm that 50-80% of loans of certain WaMu loan production offices were fraudulently underwritten - by WaMu's very own employees.(3)

Additionally, WaMu, between 2005 – 2008, underwent a minimum of 12 "internal re-organizations" in less than 3 years (as described in a audio taped interview by a WaMu mid/upper level executive whistle blower.) What kind of “leadership” would reorganize more than a dozen times in a 3 year (or so) time period if NOT to destroy, (or confuse,) the company? During these same years, we are informed by the whistle blower, that many of the better WaMu employees who cared about the long term success of WaMu, were replaced by JPMC transplants, mainly mid level to upper level management types.) These ex-JPMC employees infiltrated WaMu at a rapid rate between 2005 - 2007. The “holy grail” of WaMu during these years, was to make as many loans as possible, at the highest profit margins, selling highly complex and inappropriate loan products, regardless of the homeowners’ ablility to repay the debt in the future.(4) Thusly, the alleged “originate to foreclose” business model was born.

On September 25, 2008, it is well documented that the OTS and the FDIC arranged a highly peculiar sale of WaMu, and "certain assets" to JPMC, for less than a 1/3 of a penny on the dollar (OTS fact sheet).(5) (Actually, we think JPMC got WaMu for FREE after Accounting write-offs, tax breaks, BAIL-OUTS, and other immediately realized windfall profits.) The financial markets journalists all raised a collective eyebrow about the timing and nature of this staggering, questionable deal.(6) A well organized group of WaMu shareholders also weighed heavily on the side of conspiracy.(7) The NWHSG maintains that JPMC is NOT the "successor of interest" of all, or at least virtually 99%(?) of WaMu's home loans from 2002 - 2007. We believe they only acquired “certain assets” via the FDIC receivership.(8) Additionally, the Delaware WaMu Bankruptcy Court has not yet been able to conclusively determine which assets JPMC owns as late of 2011, several years after the coup d’etat. (9) 

WaMu originated/re-financed approximately (estimate) over 1 Million loans during that same time period. Upon further research, the NWHSG found evidence of over 100’s of securitized trusts, private placements, and covered bond deals of WaMu mortgages that directly evidences the SALE of over a million WaMu loans between 2001 - 2007.(10) (11)

IF WaMu (hypothetically) SOLD over 1 million loans in those same years, than HOW CAN JPMC CLAIM to be the "successor in interest" or "holder," otherwise known as - THE OWNER of the SAME LOANS? Can there only be ONE "holder of due course?" The “successor of interest” language from JP Morgan Chase in 10,000’s(?) (or more?) of the WAMU foreclosures is “DISINGENOUS”, at best. Maybe even – “FRAUDULENT?”

We know that JPMC, through its Purchase and Assumption Agreement(12), FDIC granted JPMC certain assets. These assets have NEVER been published anywhere, INCLUDING ANY READILY IDENTIFIABLE COURT CASE IN AMERICA. It is also true that the Bankruptcy Examiner never stated any evidence of ownership of any the WaMu loans and that the FDIC has NOT shared ALL the related information.(13) The FDIC routinely hides any evidence of WHAT JPMC actually did purchase for less than a ½ penny on the dollar (or even for free?), in court cases throughout America. (14) 

The evidence and facts are mounting that the FDIC has NO CLUE WHAT JPMORGAN CHASE ACQUIRED. WaMu Homeowners, Shareholders, and (certificate/bondholder) Investors are ALL asking the question … WHY EXACTLY IS THAT? Typically, in any bank receivership ALL ASSETS ARE DOCUMENTED AND ACCOUNTED FOR.

In retrospect, if JPMorgan Chase had no future, premeditated intent of ever taking over WaMU, then why did their related executives open up REO disposition offices in the major “boom States” across the country – as far back as 2005 and 2006? 

The Homesales, Inc. of Delaware company, is headquartered in Iselin, New Jersey. Homesales, Inc., has an executive named Renee Johnson. Renee Johnson was a long time Washington Mutual "National Manager for Strategic Operations/REO." (23)
John Berens was an even more senior executive with Washington Mutual. Remember, Berens came down to WaMU (in 2005 with Steve Rotella, and a few others) from JPMorgan Chase, to become Senior Vice President of Loan Servicing24 years management with JPMorgan Chase (24)
WaMu operated its massive loan origination campaign, especially in key “boom” States. (25)
Ironically, or not, Homesales Inc., set up shop in many of the very same States as WaMu’s expansion plan – again, in 2005 and 2006. All these companies are much like “cousins” in that the executives and managers all worked together in one capacity or another and in other various roles surrounding default, servicing and REO disposition. Furthermore, WaMU must have been JPMorgan Chases’ best, most profitable company for wholesale funding and lending to WaMu during it’s “boom,” and long before. (26) WaMU most likely owed JPMorgan Chase, and other major banks, BILLIONS of dollars by September 25, 2008. JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon also knew intimate, confidential details about WaMu's precarious financial situation from his ex-JPMC contacts, his position as CEO of JPMC, and his seat on The Federal Reserve. Jamie Dimon most likey saw an opportunity as there is always great profit in disasters…. for certain people and companies with inside information. Obviously. People like John Berens and Renee Johnson go way back to the other companies such as WaMu or JPMC, but eventually, they wind up at Homesales, Inc. of Delaware (27) (28) (29) (30) Lauren V. Harris is another such executive with Homesales, Inc… She has also involved as an executive with California Reconveyance Corporation, and Chase Venture Holdings. (31)

So these are the people who work, or worked for WaMu, JPMorgan Chase, Chase Hone Finance, Homesales, Inc., etc... (32) (33) It would be amazing to get to know these people and learn how they view “just doing their jobs?” Do they know that the REO sale may be fraudulent by clouded title and unlawful foreclosure? Do they know that the REO sale may have been assisted by fraudulent documents and faulty loan servicing? Or, if the questionable loan servicing was part of securities fraud (reps and warranties in the PSA)?
Or, if the securities fraud may have been aided and abetted with illegal underwriting and appraisal fraud by an un-holy number of WaMu (and affiliate) employees who inarguably and provably committed willful and intentional mortgage fraud upon a massive number of unsuspecting WaMu Homeowners? These homeowners were sold on the dream of home ownership, the American Dream?
One could only wonder, if we ever met by chance, if once they found out that 5 years later after imminent default, how families lives would be changed forever. Could one even wonder if they would ever begin to realize and experience the pain and agony of sleepless nights, isolation, emotional devestation, of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, of tremendous loss of money, income and ruined credit? These are exactly the symptoms collectively suffered by perhaps 100,000’s of defrauded Wamu Homeowner victims – cheated Americans. What about the MILLIONS of all the victims of 1000’s of other unscrupulous lenders? Would the bankers even care? 

This compilation is dedicated to the hundreds of WaMu homeowners across America who have shared their case information, hopes and fears, throughout the last 3 years of our groups’ inception.

- Rob Harrington* / Co-Founder of the NWHSG – 1/8/2012